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text.28 But I disagree that the only important contribution that
grounding and locating scholarly concepts can make is to re-
activate histories of contestation and make us aware that our
scholarly notions do not drop intact from some rationalist
heaven. Even if some of us need to be reminded of that from
time to time, I very much doubt that pointing to past and ongo-
ing social contestation about the meaning of a concept is go-
ing to do the trick. In my view, reflexive critique of our own
scholarly concepts should start by clarifying how we as social
scientists are supposed to use concepts—and that in turn comes
from (to invoke Wittgenstein again) an investigation of our
own “form of life” intended not to explain outcomes, but to
normatively prescribe ways of appropriately “going on.” If we
did that, in my view, we would be in much better shape to
contribute to ongoing conversations in a complex and turbu-
lent world.
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A Few Words about Methodology
Frederic Charles Schaffer
 University of Massachusetts, Amherst
In mulling over how to most productively respond to the re-
flections offered by Lahra Smith, Gary Goertz, and Patrick Jack-
son, I tried to place myself in the armchair of a Qualitative &
Multi-Method Research reader. What big methodological ques-
tions, I asked myself, are raised by their reviews of my book?
How might I weigh in, generatively, on those questions?
One distinctive feature of this newsletter is that it pro-
vides a forum for political scientists of diverse methodological
commitments to speak to one another. It serves as a platform
for thinking together (and sometimes arguing against one an-
other) about what those epistemological and ontological com-
mitments are and how they matter. One area on which all three
contributors and I agree is that such commitments matter for
how we work with concepts. There is less consensus among
us on how to characterize those underlying methodological
differences, so it is on this question that I will mostly focus in
this response.
My own view is that it makes sense to distinguish, broadly,
two loose communities of scholars who hold different clusters
of methodological commitment. Here is how I describe those
commitments in Elucidating Social Science Concepts:
A widely shared methodological commitment of positiv-
ism, as I understand it, is a belief that social scientists can
directly and neutrally observe a social world that is made
up of entities (like families and classes and revolutions)
that enjoy, or are treated as if they enjoy, a real existence
independent of how people think of them. The aim of much
positivist inquiry is, correspondingly, to formulate propo-
sitions about those entities based upon the identification
and measurement of regularities within and between them.
An interpretivist approach to social science, in contrast,
usually starts from the dual premises that there are no
“real” social entities, only culturally mediated social facts,
and that social science is always perspectival and en-
twined with the pursuit of moral or material goals. The aim
of much interpretivist inquiry, consequently, is to shed
light on how shared meanings and their relation to power
inform or structure the social world and the study of the
social world.1
I hedge so many of these claims (“much,” “usually,” etc.) be-
cause I think that there is a good deal of diversity in what
scholars actually think and do. Again from my book:
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Positivism and interpretivism are not the banners of mono-
lithic, rival camps of scholars who all walk in lockstep with
their respective methodological comrades. Some scholars
move back and forth between these orientations. Others
seek ways to cut a middle path between them. Even indi-
vidual scholars who work largely within one tradition or
the other may hold views that correspond only partially
with, or perhaps differ from, the ones that I have laid out.2
Another point worth clarifying is that drawing a distinction
between positivism and interpretivism should not be taken to
mean that these two approaches—even when enacted in their
most dissimilar forms—share nothing in common. Among other
things, scholars working in both traditions typically believe
that good research should be trustworthy and that the achieve-
ment of trustworthiness requires attention to method, while
disagreements are often about what counts as trustworthi-
ness or which methods should be used to secure it.3
Such complications notwithstanding, I posit that many
scholars do hold or enact the methodological views I describe,
or something like them, and that whether one brings a more
positivist or more interpretivist orientation to the study of the
social world matters for how one thinks about and works with
concepts. As best as I can tell, within positivist methodology
the central conceptual task is, typically, to generate, by means
of reconstruction (often called “concept formation”), a precise
terminology that faithfully represents a reality taken to be in-
dependently pre-existing. The scholar’s own near-to-hand ex-
perience is usually viewed as the raw material out of which this
scientific language is constructed, while the experience of those
being studied is valued for the information about individual
opinions or perspectives that it yields. Within interpretive
methodology, in contrast, the central conceptual task is, typi-
cally, to elucidate the everyday categories of those being stud-
ied as well as the scientific categories of those doing the study-
ing. This elucidation involves, more specifically, mediating
between the experience-near language of the people who are
the subject of research and the experience-distant terminology
of the scholarly community.4 Such an approach requires the
interpretivist social scientist to see both experience-near and -
distant concepts as intersubjectively meaningful, socially con-
stitutive, and part of a broader politics of concept use.5
It is sometimes asserted that the main difference between
positivist- and interpretivist-oriented scholars is that the former
embrace the task of causal explanation while the latter reject it;
Jackson’s review, for instance, characterizes my own position
2
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in the latter way.6 Such an assertion, I believe, is erroneous.
Goertz is correct when he notes that many interpretivists
do seek to explain and are interested in causes.7 As I see it,
what distinguishes interpretivists is how they think about ex-
planation and how they conceive of causes. In contrast to
many positivists, who tend to think that explanation should be
built up from generalizable causal laws or mechanisms,
interpretivists are more likely to work up context-specific ex-
planations. Causal accounts can be so embedded in these con-
text-specific interpretivist explanations that they are not rec-
ognizable as causal to someone looking for a discussion of
laws or mechanisms. Illuminating on this point are comments
made by Clifford Geertz in an interview he gave to John Gerring
for this newsletter. His words are worth quoting at length:
If you get interpretation right, I believe the causes will fall
out. If you understand the cockfight, you’ll understand
why people are engaging in it, why things are happening
the way they are happening. It must be clear, of course,
whether you’re talking about a cause or a causal law.
There’s a big difference. Everything is caused. On the
molar level there is no uncaused behavior. If I look at the
cockfight and something happens, I don’t say “There’s
no cause for this, it just happened.” I don’t write that way,
and no one really writes that way. So that isn’t what we’re
doing. But the question about causal laws gets more com-
plicated. There’s one issue concerning the difference be-
tween causality and determinism. If you are familiar with
Elizabeth Anscombe’s work, you will understand that the
search for causes is close to detective work. You come in
and you find the pitcher has fallen to the floor and there’s
glass. Did the cat push it, or did the wind blow it over?
The one thing you know is that there is a cause. It’s on the
floor and there’s milk all over. But whether the cat did it or
the wind did it, or you put it down in a way that made it
tumble later on—there are evidently lots of possibilities.
The point is, you need to have the story of what happen-
ed. But you don’t have to have a causal law. There’s no
causal law that cats tip over milk.8
Even the thickest interpretivist description is not an alterna-
tive to explanation. Such a description is a specific kind of
explanation, a “story of what happened” as Geertz says. Causes
are not absent from it, just more situated and particularized
than they are in explanations couched in the language of laws
or mechanisms.
One conclusion that I reach about current debates over
the status of causes and explanation is that the vocabulary
social scientists use to conduct their research, the intellectual
scaffolding that they erect, is in need of greater elucidation.
Even the most cursory examination of “cause” reveals (at least)
two distinct uses. In the first use, which derives from David
Hume’s philosophy, causes are seen as forces external to the
individual. In the second, much older use, reasons and
6
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motives themselves can be causes. The latter understanding
of causes, by the way, is still present in the legal realm where it
is embodied in expressions like “probable cause,” “having good
cause,” and “cause of action”—all of which refer in some way
to having proper or adequate reasons for acting in a particular
way.9 I suspect that some interpretivists who avoid explicit talk
about causes do so not, or not only, because they are devoted
to the kind of thick storytelling described by Geertz; they may
also, or instead, do so because they have come to see causes
as purely external forces. John Gunnell, for one, seems to adopt
the latter position when he argues that “any thoroughgoing
attempt to explain action and the relationship between mental
episodes and observed behavior in causal terms, that is, [in]
the language of physical events, will necessarily founder.”10
“Cause,” of course, is not the only term that would profit from
elucidation. Also in need of analysis are terms like “fact,” “case,”
“data,” “mechanism,” “reflexivity,” “explanation,” “qualitative,”
“quantitative,” and most salient for the topic of this sympo-
sium, “methodology,” “interpretivism,” “positivism,” and “con-
cept.”
One of my aims in writing Elucidating Social Science
Concepts was to provide scholars with tools to critically re-
flect on their use of such terms, tools that I believe can help
them use more carefully and self-consciously the language in
which and with which they think. Another of my aims in writ-
ing the book was to simply open up more spaces for thinking.
As Smith generously phrased it, a promise of the book is to
“create new windows of inquiry” and “initiate a process of
political imagination.”11 The utility of the book for this pur-
pose is borne out in Smith’s own contribution to the sympo-
sium. In her hands the book becomes a prompt to raise a whole
series of probing questions about her own area of research:
the contextually specific aims of protesters in Ethiopia. Most
intriguing to me is the possibility of interrogating more deeply
even the basic characterization of what was going on there as
people “protesting.” Does it make sense, she asks, to think of
Ethiopians taking to the streets as “protesters” even though
Ethiopians themselves have different languages and vocabu-
laries that possibly reflect different self-understandings? The
“protester” marching out on the street, I would point out, is
neither a transhistorical nor a transcultural personage. Prior to
the 17th century, a protester in England was not someone who
objected or complained, but someone who avowed or declared
solemnly; someone who for instance made protestations of
love. Today, even languages that are fairly similar to English
have terms that are only roughly equivalent to “protester.” In
Spanish, for instance, people use the word “manifestante.” If
the protester is someone who expresses dissent by means of
public declaration, the manifestante is someone who displays
(makes manifest) their dissent in their actions. Historically, the
Protestant reformation seems to have decisively shaped how
English-speakers today conceive of protesters, a history not
shared by everyone around the world. What might we not be
9
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noticing when we unreflectively label people back in time and
in other cultures “protesters”? How did or do they themselves
conceive of their own actions?
Such questions about self-understandings “matter” or
have “instrumental value”—to take up a question posed by
Goertz in his review—for at least two kinds of reasons.12 For
one, they help us gain insight into what people (in 2015 Ethio-
pia, in 2011 Spain, in 14th century England) understood them-
selves to be doing. They thereby give us a thicker story of
what happened, a richer explanation of what was going on.13
This does not mean scholars need to imprison themselves in
the language used by the people that they study or that schol-
ars cannot think critically about the local self-understandings
that they uncover. On the contrary, much interpretivist work
brings to self-understandings what Paul Ricoeur called a herme-
neutics of “suspicion”14—a sensitivity to the ways in which
people’s self-descriptions may be shallow, deluded, deceitful,
shaped by power relations, or the like. What this does mean is
that scholars can come up with fuller explanations of what
happened and guard against various forms of misrecognition
if they take those self-understandings into account. Exemplary
in this regard is the work that Lee Ann Fujii15 has done on the
interpretation of lying in post-genocide Rwanda.
Attending to the self-understandings of people different
from us (whoever “we” may be) also matters because such
understandings can enlarge our own political imagination. By
moving back and forth between our own commonsense and
the commonsense of other communities of people, by investi-
gating historically or cross-culturally basic concepts of politi-
cal life, the promise is to disturb the taken-for-grantedness of
our own views. This disturbance, hopefully, will allow us to
see, critique, and change aspects of our political life that we
had previously left unexamined. To put it another way, one aim
of historically or cross-culturally elucidating a familiar concept
like protester is to loosen the hold of common sense over us.
Quentin Skinner16 likens this grip of our common sense to
bewitchment. The seeming naturalness of our views deludes
us into believing that our current way of thinking is the way of
thinking. Seeing that things can be otherwise offers, as Skin-
ner puts it, a kind of “exorcism” which can help break that
spell.17 Elucidation opens to view new or forgotten ways of
thinking from which we might learn.
I turn now to the critique of Elucidating Social Science
Concepts put forward by Jackson in his review.18 He takes
issue with my using the categories of positivism and
interpretivism because, as he puts it, they are not “coherent
intellectual packages.” They are, in his view, an oversimplified
binary that forces upon the social scientist a dichotomous set
12
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of choices that unduly restrict analytic opportunities. Jackson
prefers instead his own typology, which he has laid out in his
Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations.19 This typol-
ogy rests on two dimensions: the relationship between the
knower and the known (one can be committed to either mind-
world dualism or mind-world monism) and the relationship be-
tween knowledge and observation (one can be committed to
either phenomenalism or transfactualism). Combining these
two dimensions in different ways results for him in four pos-
sible methodological commitments: “neopositivism” (mind-
world dualism + phenomenalism), “critical realism” (mind-world
dualism + transfactualism), “analyticism” (mind-world monism
+ phenomenalism), and “reflexivity” (mind-world monism +
transfactualism).20
I commend Jackson for his efforts to think systematically
about methodology and I recommend his book highly. All the
same, I think he is mistaken to brush aside the categories of
positivism and interpretivism for in doing so he dismisses what
scholars in many empirical fields of research actually do and
the distinctions that many members of epistemic communi-
ties—both in and beyond political science—actually make.
His own typology rests on philosophical positions that he
himself packages together. But the distinction between posi-
tivism and interpretivism is, as he acknowledges, “practically
operative” and corresponds to “existing research practice.” I
would add that authors from a variety of disciplines have pro-
duced over the past forty-plus years a whole body of scholar-
ship devoted to working out what they themselves call “inter-
pretive” methodology.21 Even scholars working outside the
interpretivist tradition acknowledge the salience of
interpretivism as a category for talking about methodology.
For instance, Goertz and James Mahoney,22 in their own criti-
cally important methodological intervention, recognize the dis-
tinctiveness of interpretivism even if they do not include a
discussion of it in their book about qualitative and quantita-
tive research cultures: “Interpretive approaches are not fea-
tured in our two cultures argument...Such a book would bring
to light fundamental clashes over epistemology and ontology
that exist within parts of the social sciences.”23
Jackson relies almost exclusively on the experience-dis-
tant concepts of the philosopher with little attention to the
self-understandings of actual research communities as they
exist in practice. The risks of doing so are to misrecognize what
scholars in those communities are in fact doing and to over-
look some of the methodological richness of their scholarship.
These risks, with regard to interpretivist scholars and scholar-
ship, reveal themselves in Jackson’s reading of my book. He
claims, to give just one example, that by my account “it
is…unclear how a scholar might critique concepts” because
19
 Jackson 2011.
20
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22
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“we have no choice but to restrict scholarly explanation to an
exercise of explication.” One line of criticism here, as I under-
stand it, is the charge that the kind of elucidative strategies
that I propose cannot be used by scholars to transcend or gain
critical distance from the self-descriptions of the people being
studied. This rendering of my argument regrettably passes
over a central distinction that my book makes between “de-
parting from” and “disregarding” such self-understandings.24
A scholar with an interpretivist sensibility, I argue, should be
free to depart from a person’s self-understanding but not to
disregard it. Departures add analytic insight but nonetheless
need to be tethered somehow to how people understand them-
selves and the categories that they use. As I put it elsewhere in
the book, “we often benefit from the broadened perspective
that experience-distant language provides—as long as we take
care not to lose or expel the experience-near from our field of
sight.”25 One example that I give in the book to clarify this
argument is the term genocide. The Nazis never used this word;
it was coined toward the end of the war by Professor Raphael
Lemkin of Duke University. I believe that scholars with an
interpretivist sensibility are justified in using this term to de-
scribe the murderous project of the Nazis. But a thick account
of that genocide also requires investigating the (often deceit-
ful and euphemistic) uses of terms like Endlösung, Aussied-
lung, and Sonderbehandlung by the Nazis themselves, as ways
of talking about mass murder. Genocide scholars should not
feel compelled to encase their own analyses in the language of
the Nazis, but neither should they ignore that language if they
wish to take seriously the actor’s point of view.26
I find Jackson’s remarks on this and similar points unfor-
tunate since our two books may be more complementary than
his review might lead one to believe. There is much to be gained,
I would argue, by reading the books together and seeing how
one might customize the various strategies of elucidation that
I develop to fit within the four philosophical positions that he
identifies. I deliberately presented the strategies of elucida-
tion, after all, in a modular fashion so that they might be adapted
to the specific but variegated needs of scholars. It is in this
sense that I likened the book to a collection of recipes written
for an adventurous cook.27 In his review, Jackson himself does
some of that adventurous, adaptive work.28
Let me expand on this last point with a few more com-
ments about the audience I imagined for Elucidating Social
Science Concepts. I wrote it for inclusion in a book series on
interpretivist methods, so the volume contains strategies for
thinking about and working with concepts that I anticipated
would be useful to scholars with an interpretivist sensibility.29
Still, I hoped the book would appeal to other scholars as well.
24
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For one, I hoped it might serve as an invitation to learn about
or even experiment with a different set of methodological start-
ing points and strategies for working with concepts. I thought
the book might also be helpful to those positivist scholars
interested in investigating the particular dangers or limits of
reconstructing a concept in this or that way. Goertz is just the
kind of scholar I had in mind.30 Indeed, he shows in his sympo-
sium contribution how the strategies of elucidation contained
in my book can be deployed to that end. There are many cre-
ative and insightful scholars working outside of the
interpretivist tradition, so I have no doubt that they can work
out still other ways to adapt elucidation to their own needs
and interests.
In writing a book about concepts from an interpretivist
standpoint, I found it necessary to point out the analytic short-
comings and ethical dangers that so often bedevil positivist
conceptual reconstruction, the predominant way of working
with concepts today in disciplines such as political science.
But it bears emphasizing that interpretivist elucidation has its
own analytic shortcoming and ethical dangers, some of which
I discuss in the concluding chapter of the book. No matter our
methodological commitments, we would all do well to take se-
riously the warning of Anne Norton: “The hope for a tool that
will not turn in the hand, for a language that will speak without
deception, for a method that cannot be used irresponsibly, is
illusory.”31 Humility should be a watchword on all our lips.
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